This is a really strong response to a severely misinformed/slightly hateful post. As an aspiring Buddhist/partner of a Buddhist, I really appreciated this.
There are a few logical issues us Philosophy Winners had with this post on Buddhism. Here’s some we discussed/argued/hit one another over:
(1.) Zachary states that Buddhism’s matter-of-fact method of justifying its principles is incorrect:
“I accept that it is prima facie true that phenomena are interdependent, and that, for example, we do not make friends by hitting people and fighting with them. But this does not then lead to an explanation of what is or is not moral or ethical. It leads, literally, to an explanation of how not to make friends, and that is all it leads to.”
First, though these are not Zach’s terms, we are led to believe that his criticism of the Dalai Lama “lack[ing] sophistication” is refering to its lack of Western philosophical rigor. For one thing, the Dalai Lama doesn’t seem concerned with philosophical rigor and is more interested in explaining rather than justifying (before you raise your philosophical brow, by this distinction we are noting the difference between getting an idea of something and showing its validity logically).
For another thing, what example would lead to an explanation of morality? We don’t take Zach to mean that an ideal ethical system evades this criticism, but that a good ethical system evades this criticism. In this case, Western methods from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics to Peter Singer’s How Are We to Live? employ examples of their ethical systems that do not adhere to this criticism.
Food for thought: to what extent can one justify a normative claim (meaning what one ought to do)? In what ways do philosophers justify them?
(2) The question of inherent desires was an issue for us as well. Zach states: “If an “inherent desire” to minimize one’s suffering carries such moral weight, why not the inherent desire to see one’s self as intrinsic?” The scare quotes around inherent desire are unnecessary. We can possibly agree (though a few in the group say no) that some desires we have just by being alive have more moral worth than others. Pragmatically, we may view the more valued desires as beneficial due to their social and psychological worth (i.e. “I gain comfort from not causing pain and not receiving pain, so let’s agree via social contract to try to avoid causing one another pain.”).
(3) “What a Buddhist is effectively saying when he argues that something may exist conventionally but not intrinsically, is that it exists because we all agree that it exists. Of what use, intellectually, is such a term, “conventional existence”? If we all agree that there is a unicorn in my closet, there is still not a unicorn in my closet.”
We don’t think this is what conventional existence means to Buddhism, nor would the false analogy apply even if it did. This is an example of the failure of logic’s foundation: the principle of charity in which one attempts to give the best interpretation to a reading possible. A quick run down to the Religion department/discussion at the temple/even Google search reveals that conventional existence is more akin to an everyday, expected life. Consider the sentence: “She was living a conventional life with her husband, until she went and did something extraordinary.”
(4) This is our last, big point before we all have to get a slice and a pint.
“There is no humanly possible way to avoid self-interest.”
This point is founded in the ideology of atomistic identity that we are not so fond of at philosophyforthewin (finally, something we all agreed on!). Consider atomistic ethics: even we brought up the age old social contract handed down by Rousseau so long ago. So what is wrong with Rousseau?
Consider the documentary The Trap by the BBC. The documentary elaborates on how our definition of freedom, identity, and psychology have been manufactured for us due to the utilization of game theory during the cold war. Game theory did not necessarily cause but was most certainly a catalyst for the necessity of self interest in political, professional, and even familial life. Game theory promoted notions of love as a self-interested fulfillment of one’s own desire as opposed to it being once a bourgeousie concept meaning reciprocal infatuation and selflessness.
The problem with this line of thought concerning self interest is that it does not factor in one’s sense of self being developed in relation to others. Some other births us, feeds us, speaks to us, helps us acquire the language of others, and most importantly identifies with us. Identity is necessarily wound up in what and who we identify with and the context of that identity allows it the resources from which to pull. To think of oneself as an atomistic identity that is always in relation to its own self interest is to ignore the necessary conditions of having an identity.
Is altruism possible?
Is selfishness not necessarily the desire to make oneself like others, and in this sense paradoxically, selflessness?
Are you hungry, too? Good. It’s time to eat.
zacharyalexstern:
Or, Buddhism - Nihilism for the intellectually dishonest.
As the Dalai Lama calls it on the first page of The World of Tibetan Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism is “universal salvation”. This tells us immediately that the focus of such practices will be on all people, not on the individual, as he…